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1. Introduction 
 
Today, we live in a modern European society, which is vibrant, dynamic and more and more 
flexible. Rarely do we stop and think about what constitutes our societies. We got used to the 
borderless travel, student exchange or the option to move anywhere in the EU obtaining the 
same rights as the country nationals. However, more than fifty years ago, the world - and 
Europe specifically - was a completely different place. Citizens were not secure of their future 
let alone their nation states; free travel was guaranteed only to a mere half of all Europeans 
and international trade was far from being borderless. It can be said that Europe has come a 
long way and is still walking, facing new challenges of tomorrow.  
The European Union was founded on the premise of preventing future conflicts by 
creating economic and cultural exchange and on a sense of patriotism and attachment to the 
continent (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). The founders of the European Communities Jean 
Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Henri Spaak and Al Cide de Gasperi were 
convinced that the above mentioned patriotism will over time “cultivate” citizens’ warm 
support for European Communities and later for the European Union  (Marks, 1999). This, 
however was before what constitutes “a European” became heavily politicized.  
Due to the prevalent character of the European Union as a transnational organization, 
the past fifty years have seen a rapid increase in theorizing of what it means being Spanish 
European, French European or German one, to name just a few. Inglehart’s (1977) theory of 
post-modern society has become ever more salient with the success of holding the EU 15 and 
later 27 countries together without a violent conflict. With easily accessible resources and 
enduring security, the protectionist need for a center state is said to slowly disappear and the 
society enters a fully globalized community in which nationalities will cease to be of 
importance (Jelen, 2011). 
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Questions have been raised whether national identity will remain relevant in the 
future; however the present situation does not show any decline in national sentiment or 
disappearance of nationalities (Antonsich, 2009; Brigevich, 2012; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 
2001; Duchesne, 2008; Schrijver, 2004).  
What we know about identities in this regard, is largely based upon quantitative 
studies that use public opinion surveys such as the Eurobarometer, World Values Survey or 
International Social Survey Program. These surveys regularly investigate the well-being and 
support of the ever growing EU (or in case of the World Values Survey, the world) 
community. A considerable amount of findings over the past twenty years mainly point to 
vast differences among all member countries, ranging from Euro-friendly Germany or Spain 
to Euro-skeptic United Kingdom (Risse, 2010). Thus, sentiments towards European identity 
seem to differ, and there is not a general trend towards a post-national state. 
Pressures influence the citizens both from the top – the European level – as well as 
from the bottom – the regional level  (Grúber, 2002). Historical regions and newly established 
ones have seemingly gained importance as they established a direct link to the EU, bypassing 
the national governments. What Lisbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005b) call the ‘Europe of 
the Regions’ which is the empowerment of regions, has initiated minority national sentiments 
and has encouraged regional activity in Brussels in the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity, 
only further entangling the already complex multilevel governance. 
Nevertheless, as Kaplan and Herb (2011) have reported, people do not live in vacuum 
and neither do their identities. They are country nationals first, may or may not be tied to their 
region by history or common culture, and last, to various extents they are and feel European. 
Questions have been raised about the existence of European identity and the capacity of 
people to develop attachment to multiple territories (Elias, 1991). More recently, the 
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possibility of an individual having multiple identities has been confirmed in many studies that 
look into regionalism and the rise of sub-state identities (Brigevich, 2011; Carey, 2002; Diez 
Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001) as well as in study of Europe (Risse, 2010). However, how 
multiple identities relate to each other still remains a research puzzle.  
The societal importance of identity construction lies in the fact that they imply 
conformity and thus support for the governing process (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). Territorial 
identities link the individual with community on certain territory and through his or her 
interaction at a given level of governance strengthen the attachment to that level and in effect 
create political legitimacy (Risse, 2010). 
To date there has been little agreement on what causes people to develop strong 
regional identity and weak national one and vice-versa. The generalizability of much 
published research on this issue is problematic; most previous studies focused on multilevel 
identities only in selected regions or in a single country (Martínez & Herrera, 2005; 
Brigevich, 2012; Carey, 2002 ; Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Moreno, 2006), and their 
results were tied to the respective country or regional characteristics. In addition, no research 
has been found that focused on all levels of identities across various types of countries. And 
the existing accounts fail to resolve the character of identities in relation to each other. 
Therefore the aim of this thesis is firstly, to identify predictors of attachment to regional, 
national and European identity levels and secondly, to compare these levels across various 
countries.  
The varied character of the 27 EU countries such as diverse administration, political 
systems and history, provides material for analysis of what constitutes territorial identities. In 
this thesis, regions of five countries (the Czech Republic, France, Poland, Slovakia, and 
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Spain) were selected for a comparative analysis utilizing secondary data collected for 
International Social Survey Program on National Identities.  
Thus, this thesis attempts to avoid looking at identity as an isolated phenomenon to a 
specific country characteristic or a region; rather it sees it as a result or part of ongoing 
Europeanization and regionalization processes and pressures bestowed upon the European 
inhabitants. There are two primary aims of this study: first, to develop a model of predictors 
of identity level; second, to compare and contrast identity configurations across countries.  
The study is therefore set out to assess the effects of individual factors on identity 
construction as well as unique historical country features. By employing qualitative modes of 
inquiry with a case-study design it looks at regions of varied character to expand the previous 
findings and offer new possible explanations on identity construction. It also aims to 
contribute to the discussion on the character of identities, which remains unresolved. 
The analysis of this thesis has provided a confirmation that multiple identities exist, with 
more than a half of respondents holding multiple identities. This was shown by the results of 
both regression analysis and a country comparison of territorial identities. Furthermore, 
identity levels were found to reinforce each other: specifically regional and national identities 
increase the chances of citizens for developing European identity. Finally, some predictors of 
territorial identity proved to be more significant than others: national pride, relation to 
minorities, community size, distance from the capital, and evaluation of democratic system at 
home were determined as the main predictors whereas others had to be dismissed. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
This study aims to address the following research question: what are the main predictors of 
identity and do they change with different territorial levels. In particular, this thesis works 
with several premises; first, individuals can hold multiple identities (Brigevich, 2011; Diez 
Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010; Schrijver) second, national identity is a default 
identity (Antonsich, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a); and last, identification implies 
conformity and can increase support for the governing process (Anderson, 1998; Risse, 2010). 
2.1 Identity Concept 
 
Variety of research has used the concept of identity. Identity formation has its roots in 
sociology and social psychology (Brigevich, 2011; Duchesne, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a; 
Risse, 2010). What we know about identities in large comes from Anderson’s (1991) seminal 
work on “imagined communities”, a community of people who do not know each other 
personally but are aware of the existence of others with the same interests and affiliations to 
the same nation. According to Anderson (1991) these imagined communities are required for 
a nation to rise. Although his work was mostly related to nationalism, Anderson’s 
understanding of what constitutes a nation has penetrated many social science disciplines. 
Risse (2010) as many others adopted Anderson’s (1991) assumptions that identities 
are social constructs. Particular importance is given to sociological theories of self-
conception, and the way one makes sense of where he or she belongs. Similarly, Hooghe and 
Marks (2005a) suggest that identity not only forms who one is but also what he or she 
identifies with, building a strong sense of loyalty and attachment to a group one identifies 
with. Identity building is a continuous process of making sense of “who” we are and “what” 
do we want. At the same time Duchesne (2008) revealed that identity construction can be also 
based on “who are they”, in other words who “we” distinguish ourselves from. 
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Yet still, there has been little agreement on the concept of identity itself. The 
definitions have been frequently utilized to serve policy affirmation or elite decision making. 
However, the core difference between sociological theory and its application to political 
community is crucial for understanding the processes (Duchesne, 2008).  
The most frequent usage of identities in the sociological term is as collective identities 
of for instance race, class or gender, which are activated by the individuals depending on the 
relevant context (Duchesne, 2008; Risse, 2010). From that perspective territorial identities 
work on the same principle, as individuals choose which context requires them to act on their 
regional, national or European feelings. The sociological tradition understands different 
identities as having subjective borders. However, when territorial identities are regarded, as 
such for the developed imagined communities the borders suddenly become very concrete 
(Duchesne, 2008). From the political science perspective communities are “groups of people 
whose purpose is to govern themselves” and providing them with empowerment through in-
group relations (Duchesne, 2008, p.402). Thus the political understanding by definition limits 
the identity to the territory they govern by geopolitical arrangements, such as the state. 
A large body of literature has also investigated the character of identities. Results from 
several studies have identified the possibility of individuals having multiple identities 
(Brigevich, 2011; Carey, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a; Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 
2010).  Risse (2010) utilized the term ‘nested identities’ to describe the multiplicity, where an 
individual is capable of developing attachment to the region where he lives, to his country, 
and finally to the continent, where his state is situated. In addition, these multilevel identities 
might prove complementary or exclusive. Furthermore according to another study, there are 
two dimensions of identities: the “strength” of attachment to territorial levels and the “fit” 
between the territorial levels (Brigevich, 2012). 
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Although some identities have been politically constructed and may seem permanent 
especially in case of old states, Duchesne (2008) proposes that identity is a process of 
constant negotiation, it is being contested at all levels and should not be studied as a static 
phenomenon. Antonsich (2012) similarly states that it is not the identity but the process of 
identification that should be studied. Identification can be understood as “a process that 
accounts for the way individuals develop the feeling of belonging to a group” (Duchesne, 
2008, p. 403). One limitation of this explanation is that the authors do not explain how to 
measure the process. 
Understanding of identities depends on individuals and how they make sense of the 
context in their home countries (Brigevich, 2009; Duchsene, 2008). This suggests that 
identities do not naturally develop outside of any influences. When looking at one territorial 
level, the others need to be taken into consideration as well  (Jelen, 2011). It then depends on 
how the remaining identities are portrayed through lenses of the most dominant one, usually 
the national identity. It is therefore important to note that the process of identification is not 
constant and does not happen in a vacuum. 
Having in mind Duchesne’s (2008) concept of identification with a territory, which she 
defines as an individual process of development of feelings of belonging; and building on the 
definition of identity Brigevich (2011, 2012) suggests in her research, identity is 
conceptualized for the purposes of this project as: 
 …a form of collective identity, type of attachment and feeling of belonging to a certain 
territory, which is linked to political and administrative authorities.  
Table 1 below presents levels of attachment to territorial areas adapted from the general 
definition of identity.  
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Table 1: Levels of Territorial Identity 
National identity attachment and feeling of belonging to a national group 
dispersed in the national territory and embedded in the 
national administration 
 
Regional identity attachment and feeling of belonging to a regional community 
embedded within an area of regional political and 
administrative activity 
 
European identity surpasses the borders in feeling of attachment to an imagined 
community of Europeans who share the common space of the 
European Union and are embedded within the EU 
administration 
 
Table 1 shows three levels of territorial identities. Some researchers (Brigevich, 2010; 
Moreno, 2006; Vlachová & Řeháková, 2004) use local identity as a fourth level. Utilizing 
local level in the current thesis would create difficulties since its political community does not 
directly relate to both national and European administrative levels, and therefore does not fit 
both Duchesne’s (2008) political science conceptualization and the process of regionalization. 
2.2 National Identity 
 
In 1977, Inglehart published his Silent Revolution, a time-series study of changing political 
values in Western democratic countries. Inglehart (1977) discusses the challenges of 
globalization together with modernization, which are also theorized to diminish the role of 
identities for individuals (Antonsich, 2012; Inglehart, 1977). Nevertheless, many writers have 
challenged Inglehart’s claim on the grounds of missing evidence for that. In recent years, 
there has been an increasing amount of literature which confirms a consistent trend of strong 
national identities, rather than its decline (Antonsich, 2009; Brigevich, 2012; Diez Medrano & 
Gutierrez, 2001; Duchesne, 2008; Schrijver, 2004). What is more, in their research Hooghe 
and Marks (2005a) also found identification with a nation as the strongest and dominant 
attachment of the territorial identities. 
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National symbols reinforce the strength of attachment through socialization processes 
in education, upbringing and the media (Brodský, 2004; Dekker et al, 2003; Risse, 2010). In 
the post-war Europe, national identification was reinforced by the presence of conflict, which 
was identified as one of the strongest predicators of national identity (Fitjar, 2010; Marks, 
1999).  
Without the threat of immediate conflict, national identity has become more 
democratically negotiated through its benefits (Duchesne, 2008). Political empowerment 
within the territory such as the eligibility to vote, participate in referendums, but also basic 
things, such as personal liberties and freedoms provide further affirmative level to 
identification and that might also be the reason, why national identity is the strongest (Ibid, 
2008).  
In his analysis, Antonsich (2009) studied the strength of national identity through 
measurements of national attachment and national pride. His results show increasing trend in 
national sentiment across France, Italy and England. Dekker and colleagues (2003) also use 
national pride as a part of their established hierarchy for attachment to the nation, which starts 
as a scale of an individual having basic neutral affection to the state to an individual with 
nationalist feelings at the extreme end. Additionally, their research recognizes five cumulative 
levels of attachment (national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority, 
and nationalism). Derived from Antonsich’s and Dekker’s basic premise that national identity 
is based on emotions, the first hypothesis that this thesis will test is: 
H1: The stronger the feelings of pride of the citizens towards the nation, the stronger 
their attachment to national identity. 
In recent studies, national emotions and attitudes have been connected with 
multiculturalism (Antonsich, 2009). With increased mobility and virtually no borders, people 
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can profit from free movement. The European integration is said to set in motion influx of 
other country nationals from other EU member states and outside (Ibid, 2009). This may 
increase sensitivity of one’s national identity and customs, especially when confronted with 
cultures different from one’s own. In addition, minority groups may be blamed for various 
problems, which strengthen the majoritarian national identity of “us” against the external 
factor or “them”. In other words, juxtaposition against others is also part of establishing the 
identity (Gerhartová, 2008; Duchesne, 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010).  In this sense, the 
second hypothesis is: 
H2: Antagonism towards other country nationals or national minorities is likely to 
reinforce national identity. 
Apart from identities being based on how we define ourselves and how we relate to 
the ‘other’ groups, our national identity is challenged from the bottom – by the regions, and 
from the top – by the EU (Grúber, 2002). With traditional regionalism scholars focused 
mainly on the supra-national level, continents (Keating et al. 2003; Paasi, 2009; Riedel, 
2005). However, in the post Second World War era, the emergence of the European 
Community and the process of European integration gave rise to new territorial arrangements, 
which ensured European peace and reemphasized the meaning of regions as sub-state units 
(Brusis, 2002; Keating et al., 2003). The New Regionalism, as this school of thought has 
become to be known, accentuates the mid-level of government in connection to regional 
administration and policy development (Keating et al., 2003).  
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2.3 Regional Identity 
 
With the enlargement of the European Union to the current 27 states, most discussion 
centered around creating a sense of ‘Europeanness’ or common European identity (Risse, 
2010). The political elite, media discourse and, to various extents, the nation states have 
promoted the European identity as a form of legitimization of EU policies on domestic level 
(Karolewski, 2011). Both regionalism and Europeanization may represent two seemingly 
contradictory flows aiming at establishing identities (Jones & Keating, 1995). The former 
focuses on economic distinctiveness whereas the latter on ideological legitimization of 
common administration. 
In the past forty years there has been rapid advancement in empowerment of the 
regions through European integration and common economic policies. What previous 
research shows is that unlike national identity, regional identity is more complex and 
influenced by various factors. Some studies look at the importance of cultural and historical 
characteristics of the regions (Brigevich, 2011, 2012; Paasi, 2003); others examine the formal 
aspects of the regions in relation to the state they are situated in (Fitjar, 2010; Grúber, 2002; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). Another field of research investigates the dynamics of regional 
political parties and their influence on identities (Schrijver, 2004). There is also a large 
number of studies dedicated to linguistic variety in the regions (Ager, 1999). Therefore, it is 
hard to generalize what the main trends in regional research are and pinpoint the important 
influences in respect to regional identity. 
One explanation for the growth of regional identity comes from Europe’s modern 
history whereby plenty of nations looked for self-determination based on their historical 
territories or linguistic specificity (Brodský, 2004). From the dissolution of Austria-Hungary 
Empire to the breakup of Czechoslovakia, tendency of nations to “emerge from peripheral 
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areas, forming ever smaller “de facto states” can be observed (Jelen, 2011, p. 381). And 
without an imminent presence of a conflict threatening the borders, the pressure from the 
center to the peripheral locations decreases, which enables the regional and local communities 
to look into their historical territories for own self-determination (Ibid, 2011).  
With progressing integration of European countries, ‘regional nationalities’ or 
sometimes called ‘minority nationals’ saw an opportunity for their autonomy claims (Grúber, 
2002). In response, regional devolution in Western Europe took place during the 1970s in 
Italy and Spain, during the 1980s in France and Belgium, and in 1990s in the United Kingdom 
(Keating & Wilson, 2009).  
Although some scholars argue that oftentimes the regional reality is completely 
different than what policy makers tend to claim (Roca & Oliviera-Roca, 2007), translating 
regional identities into concrete policy measures remains the backbone of EU cohesion 
policy. The idea is to strengthen regional identity through increasing economic performance 
or reinforcing cultural policies which distinguish the unique character of the region (Paasi, 
2009; Roca and Oliviera-Roca, 2007). Structural Funds and the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) were established to facilitate regional development. However, 
member states had to make administrative adjustments in order to become eligible for such 
funding (Hebpburn, 2008). 
Following the economic goals, the European Commission utilizes ‘statistical’ units for 
the regions – NUTS or Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques, which determine 
the amount of funds received by the respective region based on its population and level of 
GDP in comparison with the European average (Brusis, 2002; Eurostat, 2011; Paasi, 2009). 
Both old and new EU member states have altered their territorial arrangements in order to fit 
into the NUTS clusters. NUTS units are often connected with delegation of power and in 
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result rising importance of the regions. Arguably, by providing such structures the EU aims at 
helping the regions to create a distinctive profile, which in turn strengthens the regional 
identity. 
Adoption of Maastricht Treaty in 1992 further enhanced the importance of the regions 
through a principle of subsidiarity, which proposes that decision-making should be done at the 
level closest to the citizens of EU (Grúber, 2002; Hepburn, 2008, Keating, 2008). Thus both 
the Structural Funds and the establishment of new territorial units encouraged the creation of 
new administrative units of regional government so that the funds can be coordinated and the 
development policies harmonized (Ferry, 2003; Hepburn, 2008, Keating, 2008). This process 
has been gradually attained in Western Europe; however with the Eastern enlargement of the 
EU in 2004 the Commission has instead recommended centralized territorial reform and a 
‘controlled’ creation of new regions in the candidate countries (Brusis, 2002; Keating, 2008; 
Moore, 2008). 
In this research project, the main distinction among the countries is based in their recent 
history in relation to the European Union. Furthermore, regional identities are investigated 
through two other main categories – socio-historical and demographics.  
2.3.1 Socio-Historical Perspective 
 
Since EU serves as a political-economy factor, regions in countries with longer 
membership are expected to be different from regions with relatively short ones. It is 
sometimes the case that new regions in new member countries have been created on ad-hoc 
basis with political-economic incentive such as in countries of Central Eastern Europe (Paasi, 
2009). Political ideologies do not create identification with the region instantly due to its 
novelty and because identities are tied to their territories through history and culture (Kaplan 
& Herb, 2011; Paasi, 2009). Thus the third hypothesis to be tested is: 
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H3: Citizens who live in regions of old EU-member countries will show stronger regional 
attachment than people who live in newly constituted regions of new member states. 
A considerable amount of research has been dedicated to socio-historical background of 
regions (Fitjar, 2010; Grúber, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). This field primarily studies 
development of the regions, their struggle for self-determination, and how regional languages 
support autonomy claims. 
Territories do not always copy the borders of states or nations, for instance Basque 
Country in Spain and Basque province in France both claim the same culture, history and 
language, yet belong to two different states (Ibid, 2011). When considering the level of 
autonomy in the regions, we need to ask: what constitutes a region in contemporary Europe? 
Is it the population as the NUTS units suggest, and how big should it be? Grúber (2002) in his 
work concludes that regions are defined by their relations to the central state, namely to what 
degree the central state delegates power to the sub-state level of governance. Furthermore, 
autonomy arguably increases isolation from direct scrutiny of the nation state and emphasizes 
the regional context (Fitjar, 2010) Deriving from that, the fourth hypothesis claims that:  
H4: Citizens who live in more decentralized regions from the national administration will 
show stronger regional identities than people who live in centralized regions. 
A common denominator such as language spoken only among regional in-group members 
makes the group further exclusive and distinctive from the national identity (Fitjar, 2010). 
Furthermore, regional language oftentimes serves as a cultural and linguistic distinction in 
support of autonomy claims (Ibid, 2010; Keating, 1999). However, this effect only applies to 
a regional language different from the official state language. This is because multilingualism, 
speaking languages that are official languages of other countries, would suggest openness to 
other groups and thus encourage more inclusive identity (Risse, 2010). Whereas in case of an 
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indigenous language such as Basque or Catalan, development of community of the “other 
speakers” increases the likelihood of in-group formation which is detached from the national 
language (in Spain the Catalan) and therefore develops weaker attachment to the nation. As a 
result, the fifth hypothesis claims: 
H5: If an individual speaks a regional language, he or she is more likely to develop 
strong attachment to the region where the language is spoken. 
2.3.2 Demographic Perspective  
 
Demographic field of research which also includes focus on regional identities often 
compares distribution of the population from small towns to cosmopolitan capitals and their 
mutual distance. The research of Risse (2010) suggests that coming from a small community 
enhances the psychological presence and supports formation of strong identity bonds towards 
the region, the community is part of, rather than where there is a large anonymous community 
without the psychological presence. The more proximate and familiar the area is, the closer 
ties encouraged, as opposed to cosmopolitan cities that are largely anonymous and less 
integrated into identity communities (Antonsich, 2009).  
Furthermore, citizens of smaller communities might become protective of their small 
bands and thus exclusive in their territorial identity, seeing other administrative levels as 
threatening the sovereignty of the community (Brigevich, 2012; Dekker et al., 2003; Fitjar, 
2010). Hypothesis six, therefore, is: 
H6: Citizens living in locations with smaller population will show stronger regional 
attachment than people living in localities with dense population.  
The community size cannot be separated from the location of the region. Fitjar (2010), 
who found the location of a region a strong determinant of regional identity (also Deutsch, 
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1966), adopts a division among the center and periphery regions, which is integrated in 
hypothesis seven: 
H7: The further citizens live from the capital the stronger their regional identity is.  
This is because the capital is most frequently the administrative center of the country, 
it also includes national symbols and important historical sights, thus leaves little or no space 
for identification with any level but national. Therefore this explains that national identity 
remains largely uncontested in the capital and surrounding areas (Keating, 1999). 
Additionally, capital city tends to be cosmopolitan and larger in size, inviting large 
anonymous groups, whereas peripheral cities are more proximal with small communities. 
How do regions relate to the state when the state is the main actor defining the 
regions? And how do the states and regions contribute to development of a common European 
identity despite their varied character? 
2.4 European Identity 
 
Previous studies compared national and European identities (Duchesne, 2008; Jelen, 2011; 
Kaplan & Herb, 2011) but many researchers focus only on small areas of the national and 
regional levels (Fitjar, 2010; Flynn, 2001). Those that look at all levels either expect the 
European identity to exceed the national and regional ones for the sake of European 
integration (Marks, 1999), or see the European identity as a threat to either national or 
regional identities (Brigevich, 2012; Carey, 2002).  
Out of all three territorial levels, European identity is certainly the most abstract and 
therefore difficult to identify with (Anderson, 1991). European identity cannot be easily 
connected with a ‘real space’ to evoke feelings of belonging and establish loyalty, since the 
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space is in fact occupied already by regions and nation states (Risse, 2010, p. 23). Therefore, 
Risse (2010) criticizes this fact as the main obstacle for creating common European identity. 
Often European identity is treated through the lens of national identity because there 
really is not a clear framework for the process of identification with Europe  (Duchesne, 
2008). Naturally, by comparison Europe has not been reinforced through a war conflict which 
aided many nations in their self-determination; neither can Europe build on common cultural 
and linguistic history (Antonsich, 2012; Marks, 1999). Antonsich (2012, p.493) even claims 
that “Europe should not (and could not) become both nation and a state.”  
Risse (2010) confronts this view: first, with justification that Europe does not have to 
have one common language, since many speak other languages that increase interaction with 
other Europeans and thus make the European space more ‘real’. Second, the European public 
sphere of communication may be created through national media networks through discussing 
common issues of all Europeans such as the environment, economy or security. In addition, in 
his view Europe has more than a shared history - it has common principles which developed 
for hundreds of years such as democracy, human rights, market economy, cultural diversity, 
and welfare state (Ibid, 2010). 
Nevertheless, European identity still stands out from all identity configurations 
because it has been artificially encouraged, as Risse (2010) claims. Creation of common 
symbols or so called identity markers such as the European flag, anthem, Euro currency, and 
Euro passports present a few examples of such identity markers. Apart from concrete projects 
to enhance European identity, Hooghe & Marks propose that identities can also develop as a 
by-product of the European integration. Their reasoning is derived from Karl Deutsch’s 
(1996) study of nationalism, which suggests that common interest can cultivate common 
identity. 
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Overall, identification with Europe is a relatively novel process, for some even 
“embryonic” (Weigl, 2010). Also, it does not fulfill the requirements of national identity such 
as stable borders, common language and neither was European identity reinforced through 
war or conflict (Fitjar, 2010; Risse, 2010). Thus treating European identity as a “would-be-
nationality” does not provide any improvements for understanding the concept. Nevertheless, 
if European identity is conceptualized in terms of the empowerment it provides to the polity 
as well as whether individuals are consciously choosing to be part of such community, it 
comes somewhat closer to what European identity is (Duchesne, 2008). 
Research on European identities maintains satisfaction with a regime’s democratic 
performance or views on the EU membership as good indicators of attachment to Europe 
(Fitjar, 2010; Rohrschneider, 2002). When national regime underperforms citizens’ 
expectations such as is connected to corruption and other non-democratic practices, the 
individuals are likely to entrust the higher level of governance such as the European Union. In 
reverse, when one is satisfied with the high standards of democracy in his or her country one 
is at the same time compelled to see more flaws in the EU governance and thus in effect 
develop weaker relationship (Rohrschneider, 2002). It follows then that views of domestic 
situation may influence the attachment to EU (Anderson, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a), 
and the eighth hypothesis will test exactly that: 
H8: With citizens’ lower evaluation of the democratic system in the home country, the 
attachment to European level is likely to increase. 
The sense of what being a European means is most frequently established at the domestic 
level. Hooghe and Marks (2005b) show that pro-European and Euro-skeptic views are 
presented through elite discourse. Furthermore, Llamazares and Gramacho (2007) concluded 
that party cues, political preference of the voters, influence the opinion on European Union in 
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Spain. Brigevich (2012) utilized party cues for establishing the strength of attachment of 
selected Spanish regions to the EU, with the assumption of a positive relation.  The ninth 
hypothesis relates to political cues at the European level: 
H9: The more positive opinion on European Union the citizens hold, the greater 
his/her identification with Europe. 
2.5 National, Regional, and European – Multiple Identities 
 
The majority of research to date treats European identity as secondary in respect to the 
national and regional ones (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Risse, 2010). If this logic is accepted 
and European identity is conceptualized as a secondary construct, it would imply that other 
levels may have an impact on the European identity. 
 Risse (2010) has termed the process as Europeanization of identities. In his seminal 
work, he maintains that European identity is not superior to the national one as well as it is 
not likely to substitute it. Therefore, he suggests that European identity should not be 
conceptualized as exclusive, since it only modifies existing patterns and builds an extra layer 
of identification. Previous research suggests that there is a positive relationship among all 
territorial levels called multiple or nested identities (Brigevich, 2011; Carey, 2002; Diez 
Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; Risse, 2010). In countries with strong attachment to the region, 
the EU is likely to be perceived as a facilitator of power (Fitjar, 2010). Thus, hypothesis 10a 
tests the connection between regional identity and European identity: 
H10a: Strong regional identity is likely to positively influence the attachment to 
European identity. 
Nonetheless, findings of Carey (2002) and McLaren (2006) present a contrasting view that 
territorial identities are mutually exclusive especially when one level endangers the 
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sovereignty of the other. In this sense, delegation of power from states to EU may be 
commonly seen as a threat or limitation for the nation state (Carey, 2002). Therefore, 
European identity can indeed be seen in a reverse relationship to the national one, despite the 
positive relationship with regional identity as hypothesized above. Hypothesis 10b, therefore, 
is: 
H10b: Strong attachment to Europe is likely to decrease attachment to the national 
identity. 
Several attempts have been also made to show that European identity will eventually 
supersede lower level attachments. Duchsene (2008) refers to theories of individualism, 
which proposes that if the society becomes more individualistic, it will be easier to abandon 
national identity and cling more to Europe. In addition, multiculturalism should also increase 
this trend (Kaplan & Herb, 2011). Inglehart (1977) also predicted decrease in identification 
with the nation. In his study he suggests that such change will occur firstly with the most 
educated in the society and last for the least educated.  
The above mentioned post-modernist theory of Ingelhart, Duchsene and theory of 
multiculturalism of Kaplan and Herb remain heavily contested with increasing number of 
findings suggesting a rather opposite trend, however they still present an ultimate view in the 
field of identity research and should not be left unmentioned. 
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3 Methods 
 
This research design is a secondary analysis of quantitative data from an International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP) on National Identity II
1
. The survey has been conducted during 
2002. The main challenge of using secondary data is always the fact that the original research 
might not be suitable for measuring the required variables (Babbie, 2010). However, due to 
large availability of secondary data in publicly accessible databases, it becomes easier to find 
datasets that fit the research question.  
With large-scale multinational studies, the comparability might become an issue 
(Uher, 2000). The ISSP survey has adopted strict rules which ensure comparability among 
countries. Still, the main issue with the ISSP project is that it uses two techniques for 
collecting data: a self-administered questionnaire and face-to-face interviews (Ibid, 2000). 
Despite asking the same questions, it is problematic especially when sensitive questions are 
being asked. In the case of interviews, the respondents are more inclined to give socially 
desirable answers than when they fill the questionnaires themselves (Howitt & Cramer, 2008). 
For this reason, data collected through both research methods were compared to discover any 
systemic bias. However, no bias comparing the two data collecting methods was discovered. 
The main strength of quantitative analysis is that it enables study of a representative 
number of respondents; although on its weak side it might strip out of the context. 
Furthermore, it may be arguable whether a questionnaire is the right approach to measure a 
given variable – such as identity in the present paper (Babbie, 2010; Fitjar, 2010). However, 
the survey technique is roughly the third most utilized research method in social sciences, 
which makes it widely popular and relevant for scientific research (Smith, 2008). 
Traditionally, vast amount of literature on identities works with predominantly secondary 
                                                          
1
 Dataset obtained from Geisis, Leibnitz Institute for Social Sciences 
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quantitative data (for instance Brigevich, 2011, 2012; Fitjar, 2010; Diez Medrano & 
Gutierrez, 2001; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Moreno, 2006;  Risse, 2010); only few research 
designs rely on primary data (Antonsich, 2009; Dekker et al, 2003). 
3.1 Case selection 
 
To answer the research question these territorial levels are considered: regional, national, and 
European. Although attachment to various territorial units is often part of national studies, 
most of them do not include all levels or are not representative. Question 19b of ISSP also 
known as Moreno Question (see the actual phrasing in Table 12 in the Appendices), which is 
key to classification of sociological identities, has been included in only 8 countries, out of 
which only six are situated in Europe. Excluding Switzerland as non-EU member, the 
selection of countries for this analysis has become limited by its data availability; it still 
however presents a variety of countries in terms of characteristics, historical background, and 
administrative governance. The final selection of countries includes the Czech Republic, 
France, Poland, Slovakia, and Spain. Out of these, France and Spain, (although Spain joined 
in 1986) represent the original or “old” members of the European Economic Community, a 
predecessor of the EU. The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia represent countries of a so-
called Eastern enlargement or “new” EU members, joining the EU in 2004.  
It may seem odd to look at European identities of countries that joined the EU in 2004 
when the data for the ISSP was collected only in 2002. There are two arguments which 
compensate for that fact: First, Switzerland as a non-EU country shows that one can develop a 
relationship to a continent of his residence, further intensified when the continent becomes 
represented in a trans-national organization (Risse, 2010). Thus, the patriotism towards 
Europe as a continent is in fact a deep rooted process on which the founders of 
Europeanization based EU integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2005b; Risse, 2010). Second, by the 
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time of data collection the above mentioned countries were already far advanced in the 
accession process which reflected especially on administrative changes of the regions as early 
as in 2000 (Brusis, 2002). Furthermore, the elite political discourse had been saturated with 
promotion of the European membership due to public referendum on whether to join or not, 
which took place in each country prior to the actual enlargement of the EU (Risse, 2010). 
Thus, arguably even the non-member countries have been exposed to EU discourse and 
intensified promotion of EU identity markers such as the flag, the ideology, possibility of 
common currency and others, which together have provided space for identity building and 
reconsideration of existing identities. 
3.1.1 The Old EU Members 
 
France was one of the founding countries of the European Communities. Arguably, France 
took this opportunity to its advantage and together with Germany now serves as one of the 
most important states in the EU (Risse, 2010). The history of the French territory is closely 
connected to its republican history, which first employed a unified school system, suppressed 
regional languages and insisted on purely French presentation of historical events (Baycroft, 
2012). As a result, the French state has traditionally been a very centrist state, turning a blind 
eye on the provinces and their demands of recognition (Loughlin, 2008).  Long lasting 
tradition of Jacobin state has always been suspicious of regionalists as they were opponents of 
the Revolution (Keating et al, 2003).  
It was not until 1982 that the French government passed a set of decentralization laws, 
however, not as a result of negotiation with the regions but out of economic necessity (Balme, 
1995). The centrally planned economic model for the regions created differences among the 
regions, with the majority of funding concentrated in the capital (Ibid, 1995). Although the 
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old system of departments and communes was left untouched, newly established regions 
gained democratic legitimacy through elections (Ibid, 1995).  
Any attempts to compare French decentralization to other states such as Spain or 
Belgium would inevitably conclude that France has until the present day remained unitary and 
that regions serve as “peripher[ies] controlled and incorporated to the center” (Keating et al, 
2003, p. 107). However, in the specific French case, the last thirty years brought by far the 
most extensive transition of power to the regions in the modern history of the republic 
(Balme, 1995). This has been notable in the most culturally distinct regions of Brittany, Corse 
or Alsace, whose identity claims based on cultural distinctiveness were unheard by the 
traditional Jacobin state. Nowadays, regional languages and history, which differs from the 
French national one, has found its place in schools and has been further emphasized through 
cultural projects (Keating et al, 2003). It would be then expected that regional identity is 
stronger in these regions than in other French regions. 
Although decentralization gave rise to autonomous groups and regional parties, their 
“assertiveness remains limited” (Balme, 1999, p. 175). The combination of the old system of 
prefects and regional MPs created a new phenomenon of accumulating public positions, and 
its legitimacy remains undermined and messy (Ibid, 1999). With regional political 
representation the level of regional identity should also be reinforced. 
Nonetheless, the regions benefited from their direct links to the European Union, 
especially for cultural and linguistic projects supporting their cultural heritage and identity, 
thus no longer remaining suppressed by the central state. Finally, with the aid of Structural 
Funds, some regions advanced economically, which gave them an incentive for regional 
identification enhanced through the pride of their achievement.  
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Spain, underwent a gradual process of decentralization, though in a completely 
different context. After the rejection of Spain’s application to European Community for being 
undemocratic, the Spanish took a great pride in finally becoming members in 1986 (Diez 
Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001). Spain as a colonial power has always nurtured more inclusive 
approach and equality in all their colonial territories (Fradera, 2012). Rise of regionalist 
distinctiveness began after Spain lost its colonies in Latin America; however any feelings of 
regionalism were suppressed early on by the authoritarian regime of Franco (Flynn, 2012). 
Return to democracy and being accepted in the European Communities carried strong 
symbolism in Spain, and the Spanish still remain closely attached to Europe as one of the 
most pro-European nations (Risse, 2010). Therefore, as the findings of Brigevich (2012) 
show, Spanish nationals should manifest greater attachment to Europe as well as to other 
territorial levels. 
The relation to the EU and the strength of regional attachment make Spain an 
interesting case for analysis (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001). Furthermore, the character of 
Spanish constitutional arrangement classifies it somewhere between federation and unitary 
state (Morata, 1995). Even the constitution in a unique sense recognizes the Spanish nation 
including “its nationalities and regions and the common lines that bind them together” (as 
cited in Flynn, 2001, p. 710). And thus the constitution recognizes all levels of governance 
that are in fact heavily historically interconnected but at the same time independent in a lot of 
administrative respects. 
The process of negotiating autonomy of the regions was very diverse; Catalonia, 
Basque Country and Galicia, who gained autonomy in a “fast track” through referendums 
being the most advanced (Keating & Wilson, 2009). Indeed, they are the most distinct regions 
with multiple cultural backgrounds. In addition, up to 40% of the Spanish population speaks 
one of the three regional languages (Morata, 1995). The rest of Spanish ‘autonomous 
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communities’ is at various levels on the track to autonomy, resulting in diverse competences 
and not a single system. This in effect encourages bilateral relationships between the state and 
the regions and in essence aids the state in holding on to power.  
One possible consequence of the individual relations of the regions to the Spanish 
state may be that regional attachment increased since the establishment of regional 
governments in 1978 and factual beginning of regional governance. However national 
identities have not decreased at the same time, which would suggest they simply coexist 
(Keating et al, 2003; Marks, 1999). Thus although states can be challenged by autonomy 
claims from some territories, their position has not been factually threatened. 
Despite the Basque separatist terrorist organization ETA and the period in which it 
demanded full autonomy through the use of violence, most Spanish regions prefer being a 
self-governing unit within a Spanish state, cooperating with other regions and having direct 
links to Brussels (Hepburn, 2008). This is not only in case of poor regions but also in case of 
Catalonia, the most prosperous region (Keating et al, 2003). Overall, Spain is a vast country 
of many differences, which still affect its standing both within Spain and Europe (Ibid, 2003). 
The regional variety is being mixed with the common unifying factor of being Spanish and 
the perception of Europe as a partner. 
3.1.2 The New EU Members 
 
The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia all entered the European Union in 2004, not long 
after relatively peaceful overturn of communist regimes in 1989 and 1990 (Brusis, 2002). The 
countries faced many similar challenges of rebuilding their own state with democratic 
institutions, employing market based economy and the rule of law, and dealing with the 
communist past (Ibid, 2002).  
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After the revolution, Poland has remained almost 90% ethnically Polish, there were no 
strong regional or territorial claims. In addition, years of communist rule has fragmented the 
country into territorial entities much smaller than regions as proposed by EU NUTS system 
(Ferry, 2003). Therefore, the country had to apply vast territorial changes, which not always 
reflected historical claims of some regions (Ibid, 2003).  
Poland under the strong lead of Solidarity, a former dissident group, aimed at 
establishing itself as a modern, open, democratizing country; there were two main influences 
coming from Catholicism that were both confirming and contradicting this image. First, the 
people’s Catholicism, with origins in folk culture is strongly connected to national identity 
and portrays the Poles as protectionist and isolationist and hence different from others; to an 
extent this means not only different from the neighbors but other Europeans as well. And 
second, open Catholicism, which is more liberal in the Vatican tradition and open to everyone 
offering a dialogue (Krzeminski, 2001). 
The Czechs and Slovaks, besides the so called Velvet Revolution dealt with another 
velvet issue, their velvet divorce, the dissolution of the federation of two linguistically similar 
nations that have shared one state for over 60 years (Brodský, 2004; Vlachová & Řeháková, 
2004; Weigl, 2010). The federation of Czech and Slovak states was broken due to disputes on 
elite level despite a popular support of the majority of population in both countries for 
Czechoslovakia to remain federation (Vlachová & Řeháková, 2003).  
During the years when Czechs and Slovaks shared their state, their differences were 
being downplayed and similarities highlighted; this though changed in the years following the 
break-up (Gerhartová, 2008). Both Czech and Slovak identities have been defined by the 
other – or rather what they are not. The Czechs turned their focus to the Western neighbors 
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and the Slovaks had to deal with self-determination alone for the first time in their own state 
(Ibid, 2008).  
In the Czech Republic, there were two trends; first, one of pro-European support by 
the President Václav Havel and second, opposing Euro-skeptic flow. Despite these two 
contradictory flows, the Czech Republic managed to accomplish relatively smooth transition 
to democracy and integrate into NATO and later on in the EU (Brodský, 2004; Gerhartová, 
2008). Whereas in Slovakia, any Euro-skeptic views suddenly became anti-nationalistic, since 
an EU membership of an independent Slovakia meant a separation from the Czechoslovakian 
past. Thus, pro-Europeanism became the default view whereas opposing views were judged 
as stereotypical nostalgia for the former federation, which according to the media rhetoric was 
unfair to Slovakia (Bodnár, 1988; Gyárfášová, 2001). The national question has always been 
first in Slovakia. The inclusion in Europe has shaped Slovak identity to the extent that it 
created sort of a “consensus without discussion”, unconditional support by the elite and 
people of the EU membership (Gyárfášová, 2001, p.51).  
The above mentioned countries have been classified as old and new EU members, 
because this feature is amongst all their major political-historical difference. The communist 
past of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia is symptomatic for countries in Central 
Eastern Europe. It may be argued that Spain also had to deal with authoritarian past but it 
became democratic much earlier, which was decisive in this logic.  
There are differences at the administrative level of the countries as well. Spain stands 
out as its regions present the most advanced form of autonomy within a state. The rest of the 
regions remain under the rule of the countries’ governments. As new regionalism, theories of 
sub-state governance, maintains this should have a significant impact on the strength of 
regional identities in Spain. Regions with strong identities should be able to gain more 
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political power as opposed to those with only weak regional identities (Fitjar, 2010). Indeed, 
there has been proliferation of regional parties in France and Spain and less so in the new EU 
member states (Keating et al, 2003). The new EU-member countries cannot build on such 
culturally distinct regions, due to series of territorial changes that often resulted in artificially 
created regions and diminished the role of historical territories, and therefore regional 
identities cannot be assumed to play the same roles as in Spain and France. 
In the new EU-member countries, high levels of national identity and European 
identity should be anticipated for various reasons: first, reinforcement of national sentiment 
through self-determination especially in Slovakia and Poland; second, being European 
became synonymous for modernity and prosperity in post-communist countries (Scherpereel, 
2004). Therefore there should be differences in the attachments among the cases. 
With the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it will be interesting to observe similarities and 
differences in identity construction since both countries have their own as well as shared 
history. In addition, Czechs and Slovaks have in fact dealt with multiple identities throughout 
the history of Czechoslovakia (Vlachová & Řeháková, 2003). As some authors note, the 
popular understanding was that people felt as Czech as Czechoslovak, despite the latter being 
a political construction of nationality, as there is no Czechoslovak nationality (Ibid, 2003). 
Therefore, Czechs and Slovaks should be more likely to have multiple identities including the 
European one, for as Marks’ (1999) results show; one is more likely to be attached to multiple 
levels. 
In respect to relations to the EU, Slovakia and Poland represent Euro-optimistic 
countries, while the Czech Republic tends to be situated on the more Euro-skeptic end 
(Eurobarometer 62 Report, 2005). Thus, the selection of countries should provide 
representation of both old and new EU member states, both pro-EU and EU-skeptic, and both 
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autonomous and centralized countries as general variations. Nevertheless, despite analyzing 
culturally diverse countries of as much variety as possible, this study does not include all 27 
EU countries and the findings thus cannot provide for generalizations about the European 
identity for the entire continent, but only for the countries included.  
3.2 Sample 
 
The sample of the respective countries counts over six thousand respondents (Total N = 
6 294) with the following numbers of respondents per country: the Czech Republic (N= 
1207), France (N=1590), Poland (N=1219), Slovakia (N=1099), and Spain (N=1179). The 
unit of analysis in this case is the individual respondent and the unit of observation are 
responses to the ISSP questionnaire.  
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4 Operationalization, Measurement 
 
4.1 Identity Configurations 
 
Identities can be formed on multiple levels, such as the regional, national and European and 
they can differ in their strength and combination with other levels (Brigevich, 2012; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2005b; Risse, 2010). For the purposes of studying how various territorial levels 
coexist, each of these individual levels has to be conceptualized in respect to their 
inclusiveness or exclusiveness.  
Derived from studies of Risse (2010) and Brigevich (2011, 2012) seven identity 
configurations are defined in a Table 2 below. The most recent study of Brigevich (2012) uses 
eight identity configurations ranging from the local level to nested identity. Nevertheless, her 
research rather focuses on the character of multiple identities and thus does not include 
European identity as a separate exclusive category. For this thesis, Brigevich’s (2012) original 
configurations were adapted to reflect all main identity levels studied. Thus, local level was 
discharged, as it is not the subject of this study, and European level was added creating 
altogether seven identity configurations. 
In order to identify social identity types, question nr. 2 from ISSP survey will be used: 
‘How close do you feel to your county (2b), to your country (2c) and to your continent (2d)?’.  
The strength of attachment to various levels of identities is measured on a 4-point scale 
ranging from not close at all to very close. Respondents who feel very close or close to all 
levels will be classified as having nested identity. Inversely, respondents who feel not close at 
all or not close to all territorial levels belong to the unattached category.  
Respondents who are very close or close to their region but not to the country or 
European levels are coded as regional and respondents who feel only very close or close to 
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their country have national identity. Similarly, respondents that are close or very close to 
Europe but no other levels are categorized as holding European identity.  
Finally, respondents who are very close or close to both their regions and their country 
and not very close or not close at all to Europe, hold regional-national identity. Likewise, 
respondents who answered they felt very close or close to both country and Europe, with no 
or low attachment to the regional level, are coded as national-European identity. The phrasing 
of the ISSP question enables us to evaluate the strength of the attachment to individual or 
multiple levels (Brigevich, 2012). 
Table 2: Identity Configurations 
Identity Type Description 
 
Nested Identity 
Multiple identity characterized by attachment to all 
territorial levels 
 
European Identity Exclusive identity, attachment to Europe with no 
attachment to other levels 
 
National-European 
Identity 
Type of multiple identity with strong attachment to both 
national and European level 
 
National Identity Exclusive identity; strong attachment towards the nation, 
with weak or no attachment to other levels 
 
Regional-National 
Identity 
 
Type of multiple identity; attachment to both region and 
nation  
 
Regional Identity Exclusive identity with attachment towards the region 
only, weak or no relation to other levels 
 
Unattached Very weak or no feeling of attachment to any level 
 
Additionally, identity structures can be also assessed in terms of how they fit together 
(Brigevich, 2012), in terms of inclusiveness and exclusiveness, which broadens the scope of 
the above classification. Previous studies have based their criteria on a so called ‘Moreno 
Question’ derived from the research of Moreno et Al. (1998). This question is most frequently 
used in regional identity research and will be utilized for this study as well. ‘Some people think 
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of themselves first as [country nationality]. Others may think of themselves first as [region]. Which, if 
any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?’  The answers take form of a bipolar 
scale that compares respondents’ attachment from region to the state. The respondents are 
given five options from feeling only attached to region (Exclusive Regional Identity) to 
feeling attached only to the nation (Exclusive National Identity).  
Respondents, who answer that only regional identity or country identity only describe 
them the best, have the exclusive identity. Respondents who are best described as more 
regional than country identity, as regional as county identity and more country than regional 
identity will be coded as having inclusive identity (See Brigevich 2011, 2012).  
Evaluating identity constructions based on a survey carries one crucial problem – 
subjectivity (Brigevich, 2011, 2012; Marks, 1999; Hooghe & Marks, 2005b). The strength of 
the identity inevitably depends on the respondents’ understanding of the scale and whether 
they make significant distinctions between very close and close. However, utilizing Likert 
scale improves the subjectivity issue from for instance Eurobarometer, which uses a 10-point 
numeric scale for the strength of attachment, in which the scale can be perceived even more 
arbitrarily. Also, the Moreno question presents a bipolar option to the respondents in which 
case it explicitly states the exclusivity of the categories, whereas the question evaluating 
strength does not enforce a choice between the levels. Therefore, these two questions measure 
similar categories but Moreno Question explicitly poses a choice between the territorial levels 
for the respondent. Nonetheless, Moreno Question used in the ISSP survey did not include 
European level and therefore the results of classification will be compared with the 
attachment to Europe from the measurements of identities on separate levels. This 
corresponds with the logic of European identity being a secondary one, as established in the 
Literature review, and in addition will show whether the exclusiveness of Moreno categories 
will have an impact on respondents’ self-evaluation. 
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4.2 Identities and their Predictors 
 
In this research, all territorial levels of identities serve as dependent variables. To establish 
predictors of national identity, Model 1 was conducted, which employs national identity as 
dependent variable. To measure regional identity and its predictors, Model 2 was developed 
with regional identity as dependent variable. To increase the reliability of the measures, 
Model 3 was established, which employs European identity as dependent variable, however 
also investigates the possibility of regional and national identity having an impact on 
European identity and thus treats the national and regional identities as likely predictors of 
European identity. It is expected that the independent variables connected to one level of 
identity may also influence results on other identity levels.  
Independent variables or possible predictors will be described in relation to the 
hypothesized relationship to territorial levels. Table 11 in the Appendices summarizes all 
variables operationalized for analysis. Based on previous research two predictors of national 
identity were theorized. Feelings of pride are part of the hierarchy of national attachment and 
as such have been used to measure national identity in previous research (Antonsich, 2009; 
Dekker et al, 2003). Pride serves as an indicator of affectionate relationship one feels to his or 
her country of origin (Antonsich, 2009). National pride is measured by the question ‘How 
proud are you of being [country nationality].’ The responses range from not being proud at 
all to being very proud on a 4-point scale.  
While national pride indicates emotional attitudes, relation to other nationals or 
minority groups shows the strength of national identity based on how one identifies himself in 
relation to ‘others’. In addition, the relation to minorities assesses whether an individual 
differentiates between the majoritarian society and the minorities since such distinction would 
imply strong national inclination (Dekker et al, 2003). Reactions to a statement: ‘Foreigners 
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should not be allowed to buy land in [country].’ with disagree strongly to agree strongly 
options on 5-point Likert scale were used to show influence on the national attachment.  
For the purposes of this study a distinction is made between old-EU member states and 
new EU-members, as the EU as a political-economic factor is theorized to have an impact on 
countries and regions with longer membership. A cut off year of 2004, which is the year of 
Eastern enlargement of the European Union, was selected to mark the distinction between the 
new and old members. It provides the newly established states with a time frame during 
which pre-communist settlements were combined with administrative changes undertaken as 
partial requirement for joining the EU (Brusis, 2002). Countries that entered the European 
Union from 2004 onwards are regarded as new EU-member states whereas countries that 
joined previously are considered as old EU-members. 
Socio-historical variables were included in measurements of the regional attachment. 
Administrative decentralization describes levels of decentralization from the national 
government. Each country will be analyzed on a case-study basis and evaluated based on the 
following criteria of three levels of administrative decentralization: whether the region is part 
of national administration and therefore centralized; whether it is a semi-autonomous unit 
with some powers delegated to the regions; whether the region is indeed an autonomous 
federal unit with individual representation and thus devolved from the national government 
(Litvack, 2013). 
Regional language presents another socio-historical variable. It refers to the fact 
whether a respondent actively speaks a language that is bound within certain territory – 
regional language. It is measured on the basis of respondents answer to a question: ‘Which 
languages do you speak most often at home?’ which is an open ended question that allows the 
respondents to list two languages they speak. Regional language is defined as a language 
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which is tied to a certain territory, spoken by at least half of the population in the territory and 
is not an official language of another country (Fitjar, 2010). The ISSP Survey recognized 
several regional languages that apply on territory of the studied countries, these are: Alsacien 
(FR), Basque (ES/FR), Breton (FR), Catalan (ES), Corse (FR), Gallego (ES), Occitan (FR), 
Proveni (FR). As the question was open-ended and the respondents could list two languages 
they speak at home, only the respondents, which mentioned a regional language in one of 
their listed languages were included in the analysis. 
Following variables are demographic variables which asses the “size, density and 
distribution” in the character of the regions (Merriam & Webster, 2013). Community size of 
the respondents’ residence has been adapted to fit measurements of country specific 
categories. Since each country measured the community size on different scales, the top 
categories of larger countries had to be collapsed to create comparable levels of populations. 
After the correction the lowest unit includes population up to 2000 inhabitants and the most 
dense population level reaches over 100 000 inhabitants.  
Another demographic variable is an assessment of the distance from the capital, 
arguably the center of the country (Fitjar, 2010). The region which includes the capital is the 
basic unit, the same in case the capital forms a region by itself, both are coded as 1. The next 
unit is formed by regions that have borders with the capital, coded as 2. The following unit 
does not have any borders with the capital and is recorded as 3. The rest is scaled up to 5 
depending on their geographical distance, how many regions one has to cross from the capital. 
NUTS 2 statistical units will be used for calculating the distance in France, Poland and Spain 
and NUTS 3 clusters will be used for the Czech Republic and Slovakia to reflect the 
perception of what individual countries call ‘regions’. Find a list of all included regions in 
Table 13 in the Appendices section. 
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Evaluation of democracy has an impact on perception of democracy on the European 
level (Karp et al, 2003). The impact is measured by ISSP question: ‘How proud are you of 
[country] in … the way democracy works?’ with a 4-point response scale ranging from being 
not proud at all to feeling very proud. It is then expected that with lower evaluation of 
domestic political situation the likelihood of European identity should increase (Anderson, 
1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a). 
EU membership opinion is a variable which addresses individual views about the 
European Union. Question: ‘If there were a referendum today to decide whether [country] 
does or does not become/remain a member of the European Union, would you vote in favor or 
would you vote against?’ was used to reveal political inclination towards being pro-European 
or rather Euro-skeptic, which is in fact a concrete expression of views EU individuals hold. 
Both respondents from member and candidate countries were asked relevant variants of this 
question. All answers to both variants of the question were combined into one variable, which 
was used for the analysis. 
Finally, consistent with previous research, standard socio-economic variables such as 
age, and years of education were included. Education was recorded into number of finished 
years of education to ensure comparability across different educational systems in studied 
countries.  
4.3 Data Analysis 
 
Data management and analysis was performed using SPSS 19. Variables were selected from 
the ISSP dataset and their scale was inverted when needed to reflect the effect measured. This 
was the case for Likert type questions. In the first step, a comparison of studied countries was 
drawn based on respondents’ answers on the strength of attachment to the territorial levels 
and based on the fit (exclusiveness and inclusiveness) of the territorial levels by the Moreno 
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Question. Two territorial constructions are contrasted and results are discussed below. 
In the second step, ordinal logistic regression was carried out using the SPSS 19 program to 
identify predictors of each identity level. Previously outlined independent variables were used 
as possible predictors of territorial attachment. Model 1 predicts attachment to the national 
level; Model 2 estimates the attachment to regional level, and Model 3 to the European level. 
To determine whether regional and national identities can predict the strength of European 
attachment, they were included as independent variables for the regression Model 3 (Howitt 
& Cramer, 2008).  
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5 Results and Discussion 
 
A multivariate analysis was carried out: first, a comparison of territorial identities across 
countries and second an ordinal regression analysis. High proportions of Spanish population 
with European identity, as reported already in previous research (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 
2001; Risse, 2010) and strong preconditions for developing regional identity make Spain an 
interesting case to focus on in detail. Similarly, linguistic multiplicity in France should 
facilitate different results (Ager, 1999). Therefore, a special section will be dedicated to Spain 
and France and the most significant regions will be discussed in detail. An in-depth analysis 
of Czech, Polish and Slovak societies will not be conducted due to their lack of linguistically 
significant minority nationals and a rather homogenous character of the regions. However, the 
results from these countries are important especially for their European identity as they 
represent relatively new-EU member states.   
5.1 Overall Distribution of Territorial Identities 
 
Utilizing a question, which asks about the strength of attachment, overall population has been 
classified in categories of territorial identity. Table 3 presents the configurations. It is 
apparent from the results that nested identity is the most frequent one; overall 55.7% of 
respondents hold nested identity and manifest relatively strong attachment to all regional, 
national and European levels. This supports the assumption that identities tend to be multiple 
and inclusive in respect to one another.  
Regional-national identity forms the second largest category including 22% of 
respondents from the overall sample. The finding implies that respondents in this category 
have strong attachment to both regional and national levels but not to the European one. This 
is consistent with the observation that regional and national identities benefit from the 
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proximate psychological space (Risse, 2010). Furthermore, as it was hypothesized, it may be 
difficult to identify with a more abstract identity concept such as Europe, which therefore may 
be understood as a secondary identity for some (Antonsich, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2005a). 
Table 3: Summary of identities per country 
Overall Scores for Territorial Identities 
  TOTAL (%) TOTAL (N) CZ (%) FR (%) ES (%) PL (%) SK (%) 
Nested ID 55,7 3503 63,6 40,7 73,7 47,9 61 
European 1,4 91 1,8 1,6 0,9 1,2 1,7 
National-European 7,5 472 5,3 11,3 1,8 13,4 4,7 
National 7,0 438 5,7 8,6 0,9 14,7 4,4 
Regional-national 22,0 1386 18,1 31,5 16,3 19,6 23,2 
Regional 4,6 292 4,9 5,6 6,3 2,2 4,2 
Unattached 0,6 38 0,6 0,6 0,1 1 0,7 
TOTAL (N)   6294 1197 1543 1178 1209 1093 
 
National-European identity presents another type of multiple identity configurations. 
Although only 7,5 percent of respondents were classified as national-Europeans, members of 
this category are particularly notable in countries with strong attachments to national level 
such as Poland or France, who score above average on the national-European identity overall. 
Furthermore, as the table shows, exclusive national, regional and European identity 
that would imply no attachment to other levels score very low, not more than seven percent 
from the overall sample. In comparison with nested and regional-national identity, this 
corroborates the idea that an individual is more likely to have multiple identities, when he or 
she is attached to one level already (Marks, 1999). This further implies that identities might 
prove more inclusive with the capacity to nest into each other rather than otherwise 
(Brigevich, 2012; Risse, 2010). 
National identity remains relatively strong in the former communist countries, the 
strongest in Poland, which would conform the Catholic tradition of ‘otherization’ towards 
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others and perception of ‘Polishness’ as something unique (Krzeminski, 2001). National 
identity remains also high in France, which is in line with previous research (Brigevich, 
2011). In addition, it reflects the long tradition of Jacobin or unitary state in France, which 
still shows to be prevalent despite decentralization of the regions in 1980s (Loughlin, 2008).  
It is interesting to note that according to previous expectations both exclusive national 
identity and exclusive European identity configurations in Spain score only 0.9% of all 
Spanish respondents. This suggests that Spanish identities are inclusive and that individuals 
are defined by Spanish nationality at the same time as by their regional identity or their 
attachment to Europe (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001). This may however vary per region 
and will be scrutinized in more detail in the next section.  
5.2 Results from Moreno Question 
 
As defined before, Moreno question measures the fit between individual identities. Since it 
presents more exclusive response options, more strict answers are expected. Similarly to the 
previous classification, Moreno question was also designed to measure identities. The scores 
of regional and national level therefore should not differ significantly from the previous 
measurements. Figure 1 presents summary of recorded responses across countries. 
Table 4: Total scores on Moreno Question  
Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself? 
Response options TOTAL 
(N) 
TOTAL 
(%) 
CZ (%) FR (%) ES (%) PL (%) SK (%) 
only regional 388 6% 20,6 1,7 2,8 4,4 3,5 
more regional 451 7% 10,2 6,1 14,4 3,8 2,3 
as regional as national 2013 33% 29,7 33,6 58,8 33,9 6,1 
more national 977 16% 10,1 25 11,6 15,9 13,6 
only national 2132 35% 27,9 27,5 12,4 40,1 70,1 
other 186 3% 0,9 2,5 0 1,8 1,3 
TOTAL (N) 6147 100 1172 1573 1159 1144 1099 
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Scores from Table 4 above show that regional-national identity is the case for most 
respondents. This supports finding from previous measurements taken in respect that the 
European level is not included. Furthermore, it confirms the assumption that multiple 
identities are usual occurrence. 
 However, the bipolar dimension of the Moreno Question revealed, that those that may 
have answered as feeling close or very close to both the region and the nation when tested 
through previous question, may have answered differently when presented with Moreno 
Question. Specifically, the most striking result emerging from the data is the increase in 
category national only, which implies only strong attachment to the nation. When comparing 
all the countries in Table 4, we can trace this increase to Slovakia, where the category national 
only reaches up to 70% where in contrast only 35% of respondents felt national only on 
average. This number differs from the overall 7% that felt strongly attached to the nation in 
the previous measurement. However, because Moreno question presents the respondents with 
a bi-polar type of question, the respondents might feel more compelled to distinguish between 
the identity levels unlike when they are asked about each of the identities separately.  
Exclusive regional identity has approximately remained the same except for the case 
of the Czech Republic where over 20% of respondents answered they feel only regional. 
Based on a thorough analysis of the responses from individual regions, it was found that the 
percentage is drawn higher due to respondents from the capital, Prague, who predominantly 
answered as they feel regional only. While in fact the capital is a city-region, it tends to imply 
attachment to national identity rather than solely a region and thus as a result of confusion 
provides skewed results. 
Moreno Question also enables to identify the nature of the identities. Below see a 
Table 5 including the classification of respondents into exclusive and inclusive. The overall 
Regional, National and EU Identities 45 
 
situation shows that identities tend to be rather inclusive than exclusive. Also in case of 
exclusiveness, national identity is a decisive factor, whereas exclusive regional identity does 
not occur that often. These findings would confirm previous classifications. 
Table 5: Classification of Inclusive/Exclusive Identity based on Scores from Moreno Q. 
Moreno Question: Exclusive/Inclusive Identity TOTAL 
(%) 
TOTAL 
(N) 
Exclusive regional identity 6 388 
Inclusive identity 56 3 441 
Exclusive national identity 35 2 132 
Other 3 186 
Total 100 6 147 
 
In summary, both Moreno Question that evaluates fit, and previous measurements that 
focused on strength, should measure the same identities and therefore yield roughly similar 
results. In contrast with previous research of Brigevich (2012), who looked at Spain, the 
results do not corroborate each other perfectly. Certain variance was expected since the 
Moreno question excluded European level. However, the major difference is much stronger 
exclusive national identity than expected. Therefore, using the Moreno Question and the 
evaluation of strength interchangeably in research might prove problematic when dealing with 
multiple countries, unlike for utilization on a single country case study such as the research of 
Brigevich (2012). On the other hand, major trends of multiple identities were confirmed and 
in line with previous measurements. In addition, extreme scores were easily clarified. 
5.3 Spain – Catalonia, Galicia, Basque Country 
 
Spanish regions or communidades autonomicas present very specific cases. There are 17 
autonomous communities in Spain with three at the highest level of autonomy – Catalonia, 
Galicia and Basque Country (Keating & Wilson, 2009; Morata, 1995). All three regions have 
claimed autonomy based on historical development and also linguistic tradition of regional 
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languages. Catalonia, with the capital Barcelona is often termed as a success story and one of 
the most advanced Spanish regions (Keating et al, 2003). Galicia on the other hand tends to be 
described as a peripheral region with tradition in clientelism (Ibid, 2003). Basque Country 
underwent a transformation from violent actions against the Spanish state to a rather peaceful 
region with a strong identity (Flynn, 2001). 
From the identity configurations in Table 6 below, we can observe that Nested identity 
remains predominant in Catalonia and Basque Country as was the general trend. Exclusive 
national and European identities present low scores or are even nonexistent in all three 
regions. However due to low numbers of respondents per region, the classification remains 
inconclusive. 
Table 6: Territorial Identities in Spain 
 
Identity Configurations (%) 
Region Nested European 
National-
European National 
Regional-
National Regional Unattached 
 
Total (N) 
Catalonia 79,7 0,5 1,6 0,5 6,4 11,2 0 
 
187 
Galicia 43,7 0 0 0 50,6 5,7 0 
 
87 
Basque Country 71,2 0 1,5 0 6,1 21,2 0 
 
66 
Spain Overall 73,7 0,9 1,8 0,9 16,3 6,3 0,1 
 
1178 
 
As Table 6 above presents, there are some differences among regional identities 
between the regions. Basque Country shows strong exclusive regional identity above the 
Spanish average. This is not surprising since Basque’s identity has been strongly reinforced in 
the recent history of Spain and connected to violent acts of the ETA organization (Flynn, 
2001). Similarly, higher scores for Catalonia confirm expectations of strong regional identity.  
Overall, the scores corroborate previous research on Spain which revealed that the 
Spanish are capable of multiple identities on all levels (Diez Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001; 
Risse, 2010). With the already active ability of possessing multiple identities on regional and 
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national level, the Spanish took great pride in entering Europe and perceived it as a separation 
from the Franco’s regime (Risse, 2010). Therefore, a significant portion of nested identities 
exists even in regions where regional identity should be the strongest and exclusive. In the 
specific case of Galician region as presented in the table above, the attachment to the 
European level has not been added to the multiple identities of the Galicians to the same 
extent as in Catalonia or Basque Country. The character of identities citizens of Galicia hold 
already manifests itself through high scores on regional-national identity, which is also a 
multiple identity. Nevertheless, in comparison with the other two studied regions in Spain, 
nested identity scores are significantly lower in Galicia. Thus, only a temporal study can show 
whether multiple identities of regional-national level can actually transform into a nested 
identity in the future. 
Table 7: Classification based on Scores from Moreno Q. 
 
Moreno Categories (%) 
Spain 
regional 
only 
more 
regional 
as regional 
as national 
more 
national only national Total (N) 
Catalonia 1,6 31,6 44,9 20,9 1,1 187 
Galicia 1,1 2,3 96,6 0 0 87 
Basque Country 9,4 26,6 56,3 7,8 0 64 
Spain Overall 2,8 14,4 58,8 11,6 12,4 1159 
 
 
      Table 7 presents classification for the same regions based on the Moreno Question, 
which includes more explicit categories. In the table above, differences between the regions 
can be observed. While in Galicia there is a high proportion of inclusive regional-national 
identity, in Catalonia and Basque Country feeling more regional increased and can compete 
with the largest regional-national category. Furthermore, Basque Country region shows higher 
scores for exclusive regional identity, this may refer to specific Basque ‘non-Indo-European’ 
culture and their language which does not even belong to the Iberian linguistic family and is 
related to Gaelic, Celtic language (Flynn, 2001). 
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Catalonia also scores high on feeling more national, this may be as Keating and 
colleagues (2003) noted that Catalans happily accept multiple identities. Another possible 
explanation may be the perception of Catalan as a nationality. Such understanding would then 
complicate the results and may even increase the numbers as such. Catalonia in fact has all 
national identity markers such as own flag, anthem, capital, government and also 94% 
understand the regional language and 68% speak Catalan (Ibid, 2003). Thus, it is very likely 
that there may have been confusion, although it may as well be a sign of Catalonia’s openness 
and inclusiveness. Further focus on Catalonian perception of what is understood as 
nationality, whether Spanish or Catalan, is therefore needed. 
5.4 France – Brittany, Alsace 
 
France as a relatively centralized country is not very favorable towards regional 
independence. However, there are historical regions that have always differed from the 
French unitary state be it due to their characteristic language or own history (Keating et al, 
2003).  Brittany is one of the most stereotyped French regions for being not French at all. 
Alsace on the other hand is a border region with strong loyalty to France and the European 
Union, however influenced by Germanic culture (Collins, 1998). Both Brittany and Alsace 
are characterized with regional languages spoken in their area; however, they mostly remain 
cultural pearls under the official French, rather than everyday language. 
Table 8: Territorial Identities in France 
 
Identity Configurations (%) 
 
Region Nested European 
National-
European National 
Regional-
National Regional Unattached Total (N) 
Brittany 41,9 2,2 3,2 1,1 41,9 8,6 1,1 93 
Alsace 45,2 2,4 9,5 2,4 28,6 9,5 2,4 42 
France overall 40,7 1,6 11,4 8,7 31,4 5,6 0,6 1529 
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Table 8 shows the distribution of identities in the regions. It is apparent that multiple 
identities are the strongest in both regions. Nested identity copies the overall French average, 
however in comparison with previous analysis of Spain shows much lower number of nested 
identities in France. Regional-national identity is particularly strong, which is in line with the 
previous research that French respondents are very attached to their nation but in some 
regions can manifest similar attachment to their regions.  
Particularly interesting is the fact that exclusive identification with the region is above 
average in both regions, whereas the attachment to the national level is lower, especially in 
the case of Brittany. It follows that in the regions multiple identities of nested type or 
regional-national type are predominant together with a regional type, however exclusive 
national identity is not very characteristic in both regions. In addition, it is hardly surprising 
that Alsace also scores high on national-European identity, because its capital Strasbourg is a 
one of the seats of the European Parliament, which may reinforce the identification with the 
European level (Collins, 1998). 
Table 9: Classification based on Scores from Moreno Q. 
 
Moreno Categories (%) 
France 
regional 
only 
more 
regional 
as regional 
as national 
more 
national 
only 
national 
Total 
(N) 
Brittany 2,1 20,2 40,4 20,2 14,9 94 
Alsace 0 22 41,5 17,1 14,6 41 
France Overall 1,7 6,1 33,6 25 27,5 1573 
 
Table 9 presents results of Moreno question, which show strong regional-national 
attachment. Higher scores on more national and national only categories differ from previous 
measurements which showed only weak attachment to the national level alone. This is in line 
with the unitary French state which preached homogenization and strong national identity for 
years (Balme, 1995). However it confirms, what was already mentioned that Moreno 
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Question does not measure identities in a similar fashion as the separate evaluation of 
attachment to each level of identity. 
From the data in Table 9 you can also see that more national and national only form 
larger portions of the overall French population in contrast with the regional only and more 
regional categories. It confirms strong French identity that includes regional identities rather 
than making them exclusive such as was the case in Galicia. Overall, there is very low 
attachment to the regional level only, which seems to be balanced by higher percentage on 
exclusive national identity – a result of a strong French state. 
In brief, primary analysis of five specific regions, which were likely to vary from the 
average country characteristics, revealed differences as expected. While no significant 
differences were found between the French regions, in Spain, the region of Galicia proved 
different from Catalonia and Basque country. The major difference was in lower amount of 
nested identities in Galicia and higher share of regional-national identities. These differences 
may be explained for instance by Catalonia’s active position in the EU, which increased 
foreign investments and inter-regional cooperation in Catalonia (Keating et. al, 2003). On the 
contrary, Galicia has been moved to the periphery of European activity and local businesses 
suffered from the transition as well as the prevalent clientelistic ties (Keating et al, 2003). 
This development may have then undermined the attachment to European level for some 
Galicians and has reinforced their attachment to the region and the state as main pillars. Again 
the sample for each of the regions remains small and further research with explanatory focus 
of these differences is necessary.  
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5.5 Regression Analysis 
 
Ordered logistic regression was used to predict the attachment to different territorial levels. 
Three models were employed to reflect on three territorial levels: national, regional and 
European. Results obtained from the statistical analysis are shown in Table 10.  
Table 10: The effects of predictor variables on identities 
 
Estimates for models of the predictors of territorial attachments 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
   
Variable National Regional European 
Sex -0. 086 (.064) 0.017 (.060) 0.049 (.311) 
Age 0.014 (.002) 0.010 (.002)*** 0.003 (.002) 
Education (yrs.) -0.002 (.002) 0.000 (.001) 0.003 (.001)* 
Community size 0.049 (.023)* -0.043 (.021)* 0.043 (.022)* 
National Pride 1.186 (.052)*** 0.454 (.046)*** -0.072 (.050) 
Foreigners 
tolerance 
-0.154 (.028)*** -0.132 (.026)*** 0.096 (.027)*** 
Regional language -0.377 (.155)* 0.239 (.149) -0.048 (.147) 
Distance 0.002 (.030) 0.150 (.028)*** -0.074 (.029)** 
Euro opinion -0.087 (.085) -0.125 (.079) 1.062 (.084) 
International 
language 
-0.059 (.140) 0.013 (.132) 0.213 (.135) 
Proud demo. work 0.185 (.044)*** 0.062 (.041) 0.115 (.042)** 
Czech -0.233 (.112)* 0.214 (.106) 0.225 (.109) 
French 0.470 (.113)*** 0.080 (.105) -0.962 (.110)*** 
Polish -0.151 (.110) -0.932 (.104)*** -0.077 (.107)** 
Spanish -0.279 (.126)* 0.932 (.119)*** -0.258 (.122)* 
Slovak 0.204 (.112)* -0.214 (.106) -0.225 (.109)* 
Regional 
attachment 
_ _ 0.495 (.051)*** 
National 
attachment 
_ _ 0.986 (.062)*** 
N 4 264 4 201 4 083 
Pseudo R2 0.238 0.147 0.210 
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5.5.1 Discussion of the Models 
 
The first model compares which of the predictors (independent variables) is related to the 
national identity. It explains 23, 8% of the variance in national identity. From the data in 
Table 8 we can see that hypothesis 1 can be accepted. Scores on national pride were 
significant at the p < 0.0005 level. This confirms that proudness of being a country national 
reinforces positively the national identity. Furthermore, scores on the tolerance of other 
country nationals or minorities corroborates hypothesis 2 again at the p < 0.0005 level of 
significance. The more antagonism one shows towards other country nationals, the more is his 
national identity reinforced. Thus both hypothesized indicators of national identity are 
confirmed. 
Interestingly, as data in the Table 10 present, there are other variables which predict 
National identity; regional language and being proud of how democracy works in the country. 
Regional language is negatively related to national identity at the p < 0.05 level of 
significance. Thus, being able to speak regional language actively lowers the attachment to 
the National level of identity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, being proud of the country’s democracy 
again tends to reinforce attachment to national level and as such copies the trend of national 
pride variable at the same level of significance.  
Model 2 presents regression results for regional identity. This model captures almost 
15% of the variance and as such is somewhat weaker than the previous model. Overall, the 
model confirms two out of three hypotheses about regional identity. First, the assumption that 
respondents with origin in low populated areas such as villages and small towns tend to have 
stronger regional identity, is confirmed. Thus, hypothesis 6 can be accepted. In addition, the 
community size has an impact on national as well as European identity. In both these cases, 
the strength of identities increases with the size of community one comes from. 
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Second, the data presented in Table 10 corroborate the distance hypothesis (H7). As 
the distance of the region from the capital increases, regional identity tends to be stronger at 
the p < 0.0005 level of significance. Surprisingly, hypothesized effects of regional language 
proved absent in the regression analysis. Therefore, the regional language hypothesis cannot 
be confirmed (H5). Although, the results did not show significant results for regional identity, 
regional language negatively influences the attachment to the national level at the p < 0.05. 
Therefore, although regional language presumably does not increase the regional identity it 
seems to slightly undermine the national one. 
In general, no trend can be observed among the countries whether they are long 
established democracies or newly formed states. In addition, the level of regional autonomy 
which differs from other countries specifically in Spain did not influence the results and did 
not set Spain aside from the other case studies contrary to the expectations. Thus both the 
third hypothesis, which claims that the length of EU membership increases regional identity, 
and the fourth one about administrative decentralization were rejected. 
Finally, Model 3 shows results of the regression analysis for European identity, which 
explains 21% of the variance. Although the model of European identity is stronger than the 
model of regional identity, it only confirms two original hypotheses. What is interesting in 
this data is that predictors of other territorial identities proved statistically significant in 
relation to European identity as well.  
With respect to the evaluation of the political regime at home, a negative relationship 
was hypothesized, whereby low evaluation of democracy at home should increase the 
inclination to European attachment. However, the regression presents an opposite trend at the 
p<0.005 significance level. Thus, with more positive evaluation of domestic government, the 
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attachment to European level of identity will probably be stronger. It is inevitable then to 
reject hypothesis 8 about the regime evaluation.  
In terms of public opinion, that is whether one holds pro-European views or tends to 
be rather Euro-skeptic, the analysis did not show any effects on European identity that would 
be statistically significant. Although after observation of the data, it can be stated that the 
relationship would be positive as was hypothesized, it does not surpass the significance level 
and therefore H9 cannot be confirmed.  
Apart from the theorized predictors, more indicators of European identity were 
revealed by the regression analysis. Evidence was found that European identity is likely to be 
stronger in places with increased community size (p<0.05). Distance variable confirms similar 
trend, attachment to European level will be reinforced in central regions and regions closer to 
the capital (p<0.005). Finally, tolerance of foreigners was found to significantly increase the 
European identity at the p<0.0005 level. This result further corroborates earlier findings and is 
at the same time one of the strongest indicators of European identity.  
The present findings on European identity seem to be consistent with the logic of 
Europeanization and globalization. Respondents coming from large capital cities should 
encounter foreigners more often and take them as a part of community they identify with at 
the European level. In contrast, when the experience with foreigners is low such as in 
peripheral locations or small towns, own identity, both national and regional levels is 
redefined in relation to the foreigners as others and is therefore exclusive such as the findings 
confirm.  
Nevertheless, contrary to the original assumptions, speaking either regional or 
international language does not manifest any effects on European attachment. This finding 
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confirms Risse’s (2010) theory that identification with Europe can be developed regardless of 
common language as long as mutual issues are being discussed across countries. 
5.5.2 Country Discussion 
 
All case study countries were included in the regression analysis. The results of Model 1 
corroborate findings from the country classification in the previous section. French and 
Slovak nationals are more likely to have strong National attachment than Czechs and Poles. 
Furthermore, in case of Spanish citizens it is even unlikely that they will develop strong 
national identity. Such results seem to be consistent with findings of Brigevich (2011, 2012), 
Diez Medrano & Gutierrez (2001) and Keating et al (2003). 
Returning to the findings of Model 2 on regional identity, it is not surprising that 
Spanish nationals would score on the regional identity above the significant level of 
p<0.0005. In contrast, Polish nationals seem to be unlikely to develop regional identities.  
There are several possible explanations of this result. First, Poland underwent a 
territorial reform prior to 2000 and its accession to the European Union (Brusis, 2002). Many 
units which served as regions under the communist regimes were combined to reflect the 
statistical units created by the EU – the NUTS (Brusis, 2002). Consequently, new regions not 
always reflected old historical territories and therefore despite its physical proximity did not 
encourage the inhabitants of those areas to identify with the regions. Arguably, if that was the 
case, other countries which employed territorial changes and the process of building a new 
state should show similar results, however that is not the case.   
Another possible explanation may be that the emphasis in Poland was more on the 
National identity after the fall of communism and during the process of establishing new 
state. This explanation is however not supported by the data in Table 8, which shows no 
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statistically significant effect on Polish national identity either. A further study with more 
focus on the differences among the post-communist countries is therefore suggested. 
Finally, four out of five studied countries cannot be expected to develop strong 
attachment to European level. This also accords with previous observation in which exclusive 
attachment to Europe did not exceed 1.8% (see Table 3 of identity configurations in section 
5.1). This is also in accordance with the findings that more than half of the respondents 
(55.7%) tend to have nested identities, which means a combination of all three levels of 
identities. Although not statistically significant, the Czech Republic makes an exception from 
this trend. At this stage of the research it is not clear why specifically Czech nationals should 
make an exception to the general and, therefore similarly with the case of Poland further 
research will be needed to determine this. 
5.5.3 Do Identities Interact? 
 
As the theoretical part suggests there are many studies that present contradictory views on the 
interaction of identities. Therefore both national and regional identities were tested as 
predictors of European identity building on the previously established logic that European 
identity is a secondary one and that national and regional identity benefit from the proximal 
space they pose to the citizens.  
As can be seen from the data above, the hypothesis 10a that regional identity 
positively influences the attachment to Europe is confirmed at a strong significance level of 
p<0.0005. A comparison of the results reveals that national identity increases the European 
identity almost twice as much as the regional one (also at the p<0.0005 significance level). It 
is apparent that identities reinforce each other, which is in accordance with Marks (1999). It is 
quite revealing since it was expected that the regional attachment would strengthen the 
European identity more, since the EU technically empowers the regions economically and 
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culturally and encourages a degree of independence from the state (Carey, 2002). In addition, 
as in hypothesis 10b national identity was theorized to weaken European identity exactly 
because Europe tends to be seen as the adversary of the state assuming functions that used to 
belong exclusively to the nation state. Therefore, it is striking that the relation follows the 
opposite direction and national identity reinforces the European one, which means that 
hypothesis 10b cannot be accepted.  
However, these results should be interpreted with caution as the data did not show any 
similar trend among the studied countries and therefore the relationship of individual level of 
identities may vary as was already shown in the preliminary country classification. 
Furthermore, when looking at the comparison of the countries it is important to bear in mind 
that each of the models measures the strength of the attachment to the level of territorial 
identity respectively and not the interaction as was the case of the country classification in the 
preliminary analysis. More research on this topic which takes these predictor variables 
(national pride, relations to other country nationals, community size, distance from the capital, 
and positive evaluation of democracy in the home country) into account will be needed as 
well as looking for additional predictors that can improve the models.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
This thesis project has investigated the puzzle of which factors influence territorial identities 
but also how identities coexist whether they are exclusive or inclusive and if they reinforce or 
contradict each other. The study was set out to determine predictors for regional, national and 
European levels of identities and as such contribute to the research on identity construction. 
Returning to the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to state 
that national pride, relations to other country nationals, community size, distance from the 
capital, and positive evaluation of democracy in the home country are predictors of the 
strength of territorial identities. On the contrary, effects of regional language, state 
administration, and public opinion on the EU variables were absent in the regression analysis. 
 One of the most important findings of this study is a confirmation that identity levels 
reinforce each other: namely the national and the regional increase the likelihood of 
developing the European identity with the national identity having almost twice as much 
stronger impact than the regional one. At the same time, one of the more significant findings 
is that identities tend to be inclusive and nested into each other rather than exclusive as 
confirmed both by the regression analysis and country comparison of territorial 
configurations.  
Additionally, the relevance of identity research is clearly shown on the findings that 
more than half of the studied sample holds nested identities and feels strongly attached to all 
territorial levels. This is good news for future legitimacy of the European Union. Furthermore, 
although regions are being encouraged to cooperate and new economic, political and 
institutional spaces have been developed, the states are no less relevant now than before. 
Therefore European integration and the creation of regional-level governance can be 
summarized as having a rather positive effect on identities at all levels. 
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Taken together, there are still differences among European countries in respect to 
identity constructions. This study has shown however that the distinctions do not copy the 
lines of the length of EU membership and thus are more related to a country’s unique history 
and the characteristics of individual territories. Since the study focused primarily on the 
creation of comparative framework among countries, there were major limitations in the 
scope of exploring country-specific results in some cases questions remained unanswered, 
therefore future research focusing in depth on those differences is recommended.  
Finally, a number of important limitations need to be considered. First, the ISSP will 
issue a new dataset in 2014, which may reflect the state of identities more accurately. Second, 
it needs to be established which framework to use for the creation of identity configuration as 
questions assessing the strength of attachment do not always corroborate results of Moreno 
Question. The bi-polar response option simply does not measure identities in the same way as 
a separate evaluation of attachment at each level and authors should consider that. Third, 
country analysis as well as generalizability of findings outside of the studied cases is limited 
by the character of the countries. Although country case studies usually present low 
comparability on the measurement of identities, in-depth focus is necessary to provide 
sufficient explanations for unexpected results.  
 This research has proposed many questions in need of further investigation. 
Considerably more work will need to be done to determine more predictors of identity 
constructions and to improve the model. However it would be interesting to utilize the 
identity constructions developed in this thesis for comparison of all European countries as 
well as for measuring of the development of identities over time. 
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8 Appendices 
 
Table 11: Variable Operationalization 
Variable Description 
National pride* Feeling of pride towards the nation; 1= not proud at all, 2= 
not very proud, 3= somewhat proud =, 4= very proud 
Relation to other country 
nationals* 
Positioning of individuals in respect to ‘others’; 1= disagree 
strongly, 2= disagree, 3= neither agree or disagree, 4= agree, 
5= agree strongly 
Old – New Regions Classification of the country EU membership; 1= joined prior 
to 2004, 2= joined from 2004 onwards 
Administrative decentralization Classification of the region in relation to state 
administration; 1= centralized, part of national 
administration; 2= delegated, semi-autonomous unit, 3= 
devolved, autonomous federal unit with individual 
representation 
Regional language* Variable indicating the types whether respondent speaks 
regional language at home; 0 = no, 1= yes 
Community size* Ordinal variable corresponding with the size of the 
respondent’s residence; 1= less than 2 000, 2= 2 000 to 
10 000, 3= 10 000 to 50 000, 4= 50 000 to 100 000, 5= more 
than  
100 000 
Distance from capital Assessment of the region’s distance from the capital; 1 = the 
capital/region including the capital, 2 = having borders with 
the capital, 3= no borders with the capital, 5 = being the 
most distant from the capital 
Evaluation of democracy* Respondent’s proudness of democracy in his country; 1= not 
proud at all, 2= not very proud, 3= somewhat proud, 4= Very 
proud 
EU membership opinion* Evaluating positive or negative opinion of EU; 1=in favor, 
2=against 
Age* Respondent’s age ranging from 15 to 98 
Education* Number of years of respondent’s finished education, ordinal 
variable with 1 = less than 5 years, 2= 6-9 years,  
3 = 10-13 years, 4 = 14 and more years of education 
Nationality* CZ= Czech, FR= French, PL= Polish, ES=Spain, SK=Slovak 
*Note: these variables have been constructed using responses to International Social Survey 
Programme data 2003. 
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Table 12: Questions as stated in ISSP 2003 
Variable ISSP Question Response Options 
Quest-
ion Nr. 
Identity constructions 
How close do you feel to your 
county? 
Very close, Close, not very 
close, not close at all, can’t 
choose 
 
2b 
How close do you feel to your 
country? 
Very close, Close, not very 
close, not close at all, can’t 
choose 
2c 
How close do you feel to your 
continent/Europe? 
Very close, Close, not very 
close, not close at all, can’t 
choose 
2d 
Moreno Question 
Some people think of 
themselves first as [country 
nationality]. Others may 
think of themselves first as 
[region]. Which, if any, of the 
following best describes how 
you see yourself? 
Only [regional identity]. 
More [regional identity] 
than [country nationality]. 
As [regional identity] as 
[country nationality]. More 
[country nationality] than 
[regional identity]. Only 
[country nationality]. 
19b 
National Pride 
How proud are you of being 
[country nationality]. 
Very proud, Somewhat 
proud, Not very proud, Not 
Proud at all 
16 
Relation to minorities 
Foreigners should not be 
allowed to buy land in 
[country]. 
Disagree strongly,  disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, 
agree, agree strongly 
6 
Regional language 
What languages do you speak 
most often at home?  
Regional language =1, other 
=0 
17 
Community size Where do you live? 
1= village with less than 2 
000, 2= small town, 2 000 to 
10 000, 3= town, 10 000 to 
50 000, 4= city. 50 000 to 
100 000, 5= big city, more 
than  
100 000 
- 
Evaluation of democracy in 
home country 
How proud are you of 
[country] in … the way 
democracy works? 
Very proud, somewhat 
proud, not very proud, not 
proud at all, Can‘t choose 
5 
EU membership “opinion” 
If there were a referendum 
today to decide whether 
[country] does or does not 
become/remain a member of 
the European Union, would 
you vote in favor or would 
you vote against? 
Vote in favor 
Vote against 
Can’t choose 
24 
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Table 13: List of the regions included for analysis per country 
Czech Regions (14) 
1 Prague 
2 Central Bohemia 
3 South Bohemia 
4 Pilsen 
5 Carlsbad 
6 Usti n/L 
7 Liberec 
8 Hradec Kralove 
9 Pardubice 
10 Vysocina 
11 South Moravia 
12 Olomouc 
13 Moravia-Silesia 
14 Zlin 
 
French regions (22) 
1 Midi-Pyrénées 
2 Rhône-Alpes 
3 Aquitaine 
4 Centre 
5 Pays de la Loire 
6 Bourgogne 
7 Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 
8 Languedoc-Roussillon 
9 Brittany 
10 Auvergne 
11 Poitou-Charentes 
12 Champagne-Ardenne 
13 Lorraine 
14 Picardy 
15 Lower Normandy 
16 Limousin 
17 Franche-Comté 
18 Nord-Pas de Calais 
19 Upper Normandy 
20 Île-de-France 
21 Corse 
22 Alsace 
 
Polish Regions (16) 
1 Dolnoslaskie 
2 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 
3 Lubelskie 
4 Lubuskie 
5 Lodzkie 
6 Maloposlkie 
7 Mazowieckie 
8 Opolskie 
9 Podkarpackie 
10 Podlaskie 
11 Pomorskie 
12 Slaskie 
13 Swietokrzyskie 
14 Warminsko-Mazurskie 
15 Wielkopolskie 
16 Zachodniopomorskie 
Slovak Regions (8) 
1 Bratislava county 
2 Trnava county 
3 Trencin county 
4 Nitra county 
5 Zilina county 
6 Ban. Bystrica county 
7 Presov county 
8 Kosice county 
 
Spanish Regions (17) 
1 Andalucia 
2 Aragon 
3 Asturias 
4 Baleares 
5 Cataluńa 
6 Canarias 
7 Cantabria 
8 Castilla-Leon 
9 Castilla-La Mancha 
10 Extremadura 
11 Galicia 
12 La Rioja 
13 Madrid 
14 Murcia 
15 Navarra 
16 Pais Vasco 
17 Comunidad Valenciana 
